George Soros put it: 'Securitisation had the effect of transferring risk from people who are supposed to know risk and know the borrowers to people who don't.'"; "Life could yet follow death for the idea of Securitization" Id., at xiii-xiv 9 For a similar view see Goode, supra note 4, at 11 arguing that [t] he derivatives market has given rise to a wondrous array of contractual and securitisation devices which enable market participants to package financial assets, loans and investments in whatever way best suits their needs to secure such benefits as hedging, arbitrage, reduction of balance sheet assets and the minimisation of tax liabilities. 4 and investors are misaligned and whether originators should retain risk) are significant in the role that securitisation played during the period leading to financial crisis. However, the particular issue that poses as a pressure point among these, arguably, is whether and how the originators (or securitisers) should retain risk in the securitised receivables. It is believed that a substantive carve out based on the type of securitisation, assets and securities is helpful in aligning, at least to a certain degree, the interests of investors and originators. A number of reform activities have taken place globally and regionally to address the particular issue of risk retention by originators with the intention to align the interests of investors and originators and to make it difficult for originators to remove these securitised assets from their balance sheets. It is argued that these limitations on reckless practices securitisation will lead to more responsibility taking in underwriting, rating and due diligence.
In this article issues related to securitisation that led to loss of investor confidence in the financing technique will be subjected to greater scrutiny. The overarching theme of the article is that securitisation is important and that there is a need for stricter and meaningful regulation, particularly, in risk retention by originators for the purposes of aligning incentives with investors. Part 2 examines securitisation's pitfalls and impact on the financial crisis. Part 3 considers the need to have effective risk retention mechanisms. In this perspective, it looks at risk retention requirements in securitisation as designated under International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Recommendations, EU Capital Requirement Directive and the proposed reforms in the US (entering into force in April 2013). Looking ahead, it suggests that the reform activities in relation to originator's risk retention to align the incentives are, generally speaking, very detailed and take into account of some options in different types of securitisation scenarios. However, it is argued that the more significant amounts of risk is retained, more confidence will be established in the securitisation market.
Conclusions will be in part 4.
Securitisation: An innocent financing technique?
Securitisation has been developed as an alternative method to raise finance to overcome the undercapitalisation risk of banks 10 which may expose banks to distress. Securitisation has 10 Economy, 198 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1988) .
See T. Congdon, The Debt Threat The Dangers of High Real Interest Rates for the World
5 the ability, firstly, to increase bank liquidity by reducing bank's undercapitalisation risks and secondly, to spread their credit risk to financial markets to reduce their legal regulatory capital requirements. 11 In the US, from 1930s to 1970s as a result of Glass-Steagall Act commercial banks were tightly regulated and prohibited from speculating on their depositors' savings. 12 This Act effectively separated commercial banking from investment banking and established Federal Deposit Insurance Cooperation (FDIC). 13 Around the world, loans have been traditionally extended through deposits which are guaranteed by governments.
14 Particularly, in the late 1960s with the increased demand for mortgages, banks in the United States developed a model that enabled them to raise finance faster (without the need to limit their funding to deposits) and more balanced than other methods of raising finance according to which banks were pooling portfolios of mortgages the cash flows of which were then securitised and sold on to investors. 15 The significance in this type of raising finance is the United States Government's 'full faith and credit' through the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA), in the sense that GNMA guarantees investors the payment of principal and interest on mortgages based securities that are insured by qualifying government departments. effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for other purposes."
13 FDIC provides insurance on deposits and effectively protects depositors against bank runs.
14 For a list and comparability of Deposit insurance/protection schemes see www.hmrc.gov.uk/drafts/schemescomp-fscs.pdf (accessed 5.02.2012) 15 See generally Hull, supra note 4, at 189 et seq. The ratings of mortgage backed securitisations have been based and rated on the similar formulas used in asset backed securitisations, hence the triple-A rating of majority of mortgage backed securities from subprime borrowers. Furthermore, the subprime loans which were converted into securitised bonds and incorporated with other asset backed bonds and were sold to investors who were not necessarily sophisticated enough to realise the risks passing through the financial markets. 
Securitisation's role in the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis takes its roots in the American subprime mortgage crisis. securitisations. Arguably these were high-risk loans because there was no guarantee whether subprime borrowers could be able to repay. These loans were gathered and sold to investment firms and SPVs. Rating agencies rather traditionally have given high ratings to mortgage backed securities because the default rate on those rates were traditionally lower than the asset backed securities. The underwriting standards in those types of assets were different than the normal securitisation practices. Despite the fact that securities were backed by subprime mortgages, they were continuously highly rated and the lack of liquidity in those highly rated securities due to defaults on the mortgage payments led to the collapse of securitisation market. is that without a meaningful regulation of innovative financial transactions, the market may grow unregulated to the detriment of the global economy. 46 It has been argued that deregulation has affected the banks' dependency on financial markets which may lead to loss of confidence and run on banks when market funding becomes sparse in which case those financial institutions that are funded mainly through deposits will be preferable. This is because deposits provide more predictable funding alternative and are guaranteed by governments as opposed to market funding from volatile and deregulated financial markets.
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Recently proposals have been made to prohibit banks from certain types of risk taking activities. The most significant one is the Volcker Rule, which prohibits banks from entering into proprietary trading and acquiring an ownership interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund. 48 However, there are also other views that oppose Volcker rule and suggest that universal banking was not the main problem but rather it was the quality of securities issued by the banks during the period leading to the crisis. 
Pitfalls of Securitisation
The main pitfalls of securitisation are insufficiency of transparency and disclosure, difficulties in determining investor suitability in appreciating the risks and the inadequacy of risk retention by originators. Additionally, the financial crisis has justified the fact that investors have over relied on the credit agencies' ratings who applied the same criteria for rating asset backed securities to mortgage backed securitisations. Credit rating agencies provided AAA rating for most products even though they were from subprime borrowers.
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Complex nature of financial markets and transactions arguably were created 'due to demand by investors for securities that meet their investment criteria and their appetite for ever higher yields.' 51 However, the significant risk that securitisation involved was the transfer of risk with little due diligence from the originator to investors as a result of which there was reduced incentives to screen the quality of loans securitised and failure to adequately retain the risk in those securitised loans. 52 As securitisation has an extremely complex and technical structure and involves certain risks (such as interest rate and prepayment risks), it lacks the desired level of transparency according to which the quality of loans and the level of risks are determinable by investors.
Professor Schwarcz argues that despite the disclosure of risks involved in mortgage backed securities, this has proved to be insufficient and the complex nature of securitisation as well as the length of documentation in the offering of these securities has had an impact on the insufficiency of information in this market. 53 Ideally, the information on the products should be openly available to investors. Investors rely on ratings by credit rating agencies and the agencies are paid by originators. Insufficiency of transparency has occurred in different levels and dimensions of securitisation which creates a conflict of interest. These include valuation, pricing and concentration of risk. 54 The complex nature of mortgage backed securitisation has led to the insufficiency of disclosure, as investors were not certain in relation to the value of the securities that they have invested on and exposed them to credit risk. This is also called as the 'concentration of risk' according to which lack of detailed reporting of exposures caused the market participants to be non-informed of the risks which then 'led to a reluctance to 50 T. Hurst. 'The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the current worldwide financial crisis ' 30 Comp. Law. 61 been argued that disclosure in complex securitisation transactions cannot be a decisive solution as 'complexity increases the amount of information that must be analysed in order to value the investment with a degree of certainty.' 56 Furthermore, it was also argued that in those complex transactions and structuring models investors who review those documents might not realise the legal consequences of the transactions. 57 In the absence of adequate transparency, investors have generally relied on the credit agencies' ratings in their investment decisions. 58 However, these ratings, which were generally and generously attributed to bonds at the highest possible value, did not consider the fact that receivables from subprime mortgages were incorporated to the receivables from asset securitisations, thus in the event of originator's bankruptcy created a package deal in which the toxic portfolios could not be separated from the non-toxic ones. Additionally, the IMF report has pointed out that the Off-Balance-Sheet entities (such as commercial paper conduits or special investment vehicles) have not been transparent to regulators.
59
In relation to the transparency and disclosure arguments, the private law processes of securitisation may have a negative impact on third parties (i.e. unsecured creditors of the originator) by reducing the assets available to unsecured creditors. As unsecured creditors, unlike the secured creditors, will be subject to the pari passu principle according to which in the event of bankruptcy of the originator the distribution will be made on an equal footing, unsecured creditors' proportion of claims will be reduced. This is because the originator will transfer those assets and receivables that have the ability to attract higher rates to the SPV. Money, Credit & Banking 524, 540 (1998) noting that the …reasons they can do so is that the greater integration of markets has increased the frequency of transactions any single player undertakes. Reputation not only becomes easier to build, but also more important to maintain as banks fund loans through their placing power rather than their balance sheets. requirements are based on the idea that the "securitizer" is selling assets that it would never buy itself to a market that lacks the securitizer's knowledge about the quality of the underlying asset backing the security.' [a] bank that wants to profitably lend to high-quality credits has to either bolster its capital so that its own credit quality improves, or find a convincing way to commit to the market that it will keep only high-quality loans on its balance sheet. ... Rather than lending to a firm and keeping the loan at high cost on its balance sheet, it makes sense for the bank to lend only on a contingent basis-when all other sources of funds dry up and the firm is a high risk. ...the least risky, or 'senior', tranche has the first claim on payments from the pooled mortgages. The 'senior' tranche has the highest credit rating, often triple-A investment grade, but receives a lower rate of interest than the other tranches. After the senior claims are paid, the middle or mezzanine tranche receives its payments.
Mezzanine represents greater risk and usually receives below-investment grade credit ratings and a higher rate of return. The lowest, or equity, tranche receives payments only if the senior and mezzanine tranches are paid in full. The equity/first-loss tranche absorbs initial losses. Equity tranches are therefore the most risky tranche and consequently often unrated, but as a consequence offer the highest rate of return. This process, whereby losses are applied to more 'junior' tranches before they are applied to more 'senior' tranches, is known as subordination and is one, albeit important, form of credit enhancement.
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Amendments to the current incentivisation system have been proposed by the IOSCO, the EU and the USA. These include retaining credit risk in the equity tranche, a vertical risk retention structure in all tranches or a percentage share. crisis the amendments to the current incentivisation scheme in the EU and the USA were criticised by being unsophisticated or too flexible that the choice of amount and form have been left to the originator which might not lead to best results. enhanced transparency through disclosure by issuers; independence of service providers from issuers in order to ensure that service providers do not influence an investor's decision to purchase securitised products; updating investors about initial and ongoing information on underlying asset pool performance and strengthening investor suitability. Recommendation 1.1 states 'originators and/or sponsors to retain a long-term economic exposure to the securitisation in order to … align interests in the securitisation value chain.' 99 This is supported by three principles which establish that any retention requirement must be considered taking into account of the impact of the reform in domestic securitisation markets that this implementation needs to regard the quality of the underlying collateral backing the securities and that it should consider the legal processes of securitisation in the relevant jurisdiction. The Implementation Report pointed out that there was no clarity with regards to the form of risk retention (i.e. whether a fixed percentage or a risk-based approach for risky assets). originators to disclose the relevant information to investors for the purposes of due diligence and issuers and originators to retain the credit risk. The significance of the minimum level of risk retention (5 per cent), which may be higher depending on the risks associated with underlying assets and transparency level, rather than a specific form is that misalignment of incentives differ in different securitisations and that the crucial point is the ability of the investor to appreciate the risk in that securitisation. 104 The EU impact report noted that a regulatory minimum retention level appears very relevant as a regulatory backstop mechanism to improve market resilience in time when bubbles build up [and] such regulatory backstop should not be set too high. For relatively transparent securitisations where the information disadvantage of investors is small, the moderate 5% minimum may actually constitute the adequate level….a higher than necessary retention requirement could potentially imply that certain non-bank issuers would find securitisations not an attractive business model anymore, meaning that they leave the markets and thereby reduce competition among lenders.
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The amendment to the CRD highlights problems with weak underwriting standards caused by the originate-to-distribute model which does not allow credit risk retention. Article 122a
requires that for exposure to the credit risk the originator must disclose explicitly to the credit institution that it will retain net economic interest of which cannot be less than 5 per cent. The amendment requires originators to disclose the level of retention and ensure that investors have the necessary access to the relevant data and employ the same standard to the loans securitised and exposures on their trading books. These amendments aim to strengthen the quality of origination and disclosure. The disclosure requirements of originators, in addition to risk retention requirements as specified above, require them to disclose the amount and details of the retained exposures. This will establish flexibility and investors are able to determine the size and form of risk retention by originators. Accordingly, a credit institution when investing in securitisation as a securitiser is required to get confirmation from the originator, sponsor or the original lender that minimum 5 per cent risk has been retained. The credit institution, as a securitiser, is also required to provide the relevant information, while investing in securitisation, to the regulators that it has thorough understanding of the risks and securitisation positions, thus it has complied with the due diligence requirements. If the credit 104 Id., 5-6.
105 Id., 6. 25 institution is acting as sponsor or originator, it has to apply the same credit criteria to exposure to be securitised as they apply to exposures to be held in their book. Along the same lines, the credit institution as sponsor or originator has to disclose to investors the level of its retention commitment to maintain a net economic interest in the securitisation, thus, will fulfil the disclosure requirement.
The retention of net economic interest, providing different options, has been defined under article 122a (1) 
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The rule, provided by section 941b, in SEA 15G 119 requires that minimum 5 per cent credit risk will be retained by the securitiser for any asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage that is sold through the issuance of an asset-backed security or that is a qualified residential mortgage that is sold through the issuance of asset-backed security if one or more of the 
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Although this reform somewhat presents certainty and protection for investors by, to a certain extent, aligning the interests of originators, securitisers and investors, it is, arguably, a compromise. This is because the roots of the financial crisis can be found in the mortgage based securitisation where the incentives were misaligned and residential mortgages that were sold to subprime borrowers were securitised and mixed with asset based securities. It is a compromise in the sense that residential mortgages have been exempted from the risk retention requirements through detailed regulations that will be enacted to supplement the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The form and portion of risk retention (e.g. whether base risk retention, vertical or horizontal risk retention by sponsor L-shaped risk retention or retention by sponsor of representative sample) has not been clarified in the Act and it has been left to the discretion of the federal banking agencies and the Securities Exchange
Commission. This will be achieved through regulations which will be prescribed by the federal banking agencies and the Securities Exchange Commission. Furthermore, retention of less than 5 per cent of the credit risk for an asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage if the originator meets the underwriting standards (section 15G(c)) seems to be vague. Because the underwriting standards of these assets, which could be commercial loans, auto-loans or commercial mortgages, could be different and the portion of risk retention might vary.
Moreover, allocating risk between originators and securitisers has the danger of financial institutions purchasing assets from other originators and securitising them because they can share risk with those originators where their risk percentage is reduced to the extent of the originator's percentage. This is more advantageous for securitisers because they do not have to securitise their own in-house assets (in which they are originators and securitisers and cannot share the risk). It has been argued that '[a]ggregate risk retention could be significantly diluted if securitizers reduce their credit risk by sharing it with originators, and originators evade much of their risk by hedging against it.' 121 Section 15G(c)(1) do not allow securitisers to hedge the credit risk. Thus, it has been argued that the regulatory attempts of the Act are not forceful enough to respond to the issues that may arise from ever changing financial innovation.
122 121 'Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2010 ' 30 Rev. Banking & Fin. Law 1, 49 (2010 .
It was noted that '...the higher the percentage of risk assigned to originators, the less effective retention requirements will be at eliminating the same morel hazards that previously prompted irresponsible lending and 
Conclusions
Securitisation offers a low cost funding ability for the originator and provides improved liquidity. It also offers the flexibility to the originator to remove the securitised asset from the balance sheet so that these assets (loans and receivables owed to the originator) do not weigh down the balance sheet thus capital adequacy versus trade books ratio of the originator is improved. Securitisation diversifies credit risk for the originator and enables the originator to use different sources of funding whereby increasing their liquidity levels; banks are able to provide further loans depending on the business cycle conditions and their credit risk.
The excessive usage of originate-to-distribute model in securitisation without meaningful credit risk retention helped increase house prices and led to the decline of underwriting standards. This process illustrated the distinct incentives of originators, securitisers and investors. Securitisation, when used properly, is a significant method of raising finance.
However, more coherent and transparent system of securitisation and better understanding of its limits may help prevent further crisis based on securitisation. Reforms in the EU and USA provide resemblances. Both reform activities provide exemptions, although these exemptions, arguably, do not help align incentives. The EU reform clearly sets out the form and portion of retention of net economic interests, whereas the same cannot be argued for the US reform.
Studies have revealed that 'performance is better when the originator retains skin in the game as a result of affiliation with the deal sponsor or the loan servicer." 123 However, it is also clear that before the financial crisis originators and lenders voluntarily had kept some of the credit risk in their portfolios and that did not prevent the collapse of markets. It would have been more persuasive, had both the EU and US reforms, which require compulsory credit risk retention, provided variable risk retention percentages.
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It is clear that the IOSCO's recommendations provide general framework for legislators by providing a principle that originators must retain economic interest in the securities sold to investors. Reforms in the EU and the USA as well as the IOSCO recommendations will, arguably, align the incentives of originators, securitisers and investors and implementation of those reforms will act as deterrent and inject confidence in the markets. It is believed that no concrete regulation will ever be effective against the innovativeness of financial markets.
However, if the effective risk retention and due diligence goals are achieved, securitisation may continue to serve its benefits to investors.
